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REcENT CAsEs
LIFE ESTATES AND ThusTs-ALLoCATON OF STocK DrmEDs-Under a
testamentary disposition to successive legatees "all dividends" were
given expressly to the life tenant as income beneficiary. Three stock
dividends, of 50%, 33V% and 25%, were declared on shares in a bank
corporation so bequeathed. In proceedings between the remaindermen
and the assignees of life tenant, the lower court held that all of the 251/
shares paid to the assignees as stock dividends should be allocated to
the life tenant as income. This holding followed past Kentucky de-
cisions, but on appeal the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, and
adopted the so-called "Massachusetts" rule for allocating such divi-
dends. This rule awards the entire extraordinary dividend from earn-
ings to principal if it is essentially a stock dividend, and to income if it
is essentially a cash dividend. Bowles v. Stilley's Exer, 267 S.W. 2d
707 (Ky. 1954).
It should be noted at the outset that the successive estates of owner-
ship here were legal, but the principles governing the proper division
of stock dividends are substantially the same where the property is
held in trust. In the authorities, these principles are usually classified
as "trust" principles and this terminology is followed in this com-
ment.'
In a trust for successive beneficiaries the trustee is obligated to
perform his fiduciary duties with equal loyalty to the income bene-
ficiary and the principal beneficiary. The receipt of a stock dividend
creates two problems for the trustee: First, the dividend must be al-
located to the income account or to the principal account, depending
on whether it is treated as an item of current receipts or as an incre-
ment to capital. Second, where it is treated as income, it may be neces-
sary to apportion it between the life tenant and the remaindermen,
depending on whether it was realized in whole or in part during the
period of time when the life tenant is entitled to trust income. If it
was realized before the commencement of the life estate, or after its
end, the stock dividend, like any other dividend, cannot be distributed
as income even though it is by nature a current receipt. Problems of
allocation are resolved by the nature of the receipt, while problems
of apportionment are concerned with time when the receipt was
realized, regardless of its nature."' The instant case clearly involves
'33 AM. Jim. 463, 900 (1941). The proper classification of the problem ap-
parently created some difficulty in preparing the head note for this case, as the
advance sheets report carried a life estates head note (key number 15.2), whereas
the bound report bears a trusts headnote (key number 272.3).
" 2 ScoTT, Tnusis sees. 232-283.1, 285 (1939). Of course, it should be em-
phasized that the intention of the testator will be followed by any jurisdiction,
even contrary to the state's view. Laurent v. Randolph, 306 Ky. 134, 139, 206
S.W. 2d 480, 483 (1947).
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only the problem of allocation, and is of interest primarily because the
court seems to have ignored completely a statutory formula, adopted
in 1950, for allocating stock dividends in Kentucky.
Prior to 1950, stock dividends were governed by the so-called "Ken-
tucky" rule as to allocation of all extraordinary corporate dividends
which awarded them in their entirety to the life tenant whether they
were stock dividends or cash dividends.2 The rule also "apportioned"
all extraordinary dividends, including stock dividends, to income
wholly after, or partly before or partly after, the commencement of
dends to the remaindermen if the earnings embraced by the extra-
the life estate. This all inclusive and simple rule, followed by perhaps
only one other state,3 looked only to the nature of the receipt and not
to the time when it was realized. At the time of its adoption the court
recognized that the then current of authority held that all dividends
were non-apportionable whether payable in stock or in money. They
were to be considered as accruing in their entirety as of the date when
declared.4 In Hite v. Hite,5 the court reasoned that where a stock
dividend was declared on earnings, it was profit and therefore had to
be income. The court also pointed out that ".... really a corporation
has no right to declare a dividend, either in cash or stock, except from
its earnings .. "6
Besides the old "Kentucky" rule and the "Massachusetts" rule
adopted by the Court of Appeals in the instant case, there is the "Penn-
sylvania" rule, which seems to reach the apportionment problem only,
avoiding the allocation problem directly. This rule gives stock divi-
dends to the remaindermen if the earnings embraced by the extra-
ordinary distribution were earned before the commencement of the
life estate. If earned after that time, the dividends go to the life tenant
as income,7 although by nature they might represent an increment to
'Laurent v. Randolph, supra note 1; Hubley's Guardian v. Wolfe, 259 Ky.
574, 82 S.W. 2d 830 (1985); Robinson v. Robinson's Ex'r, 221 Ky. 245, 298
S.W. 701 (1927); Cox v. Gaulbert's Trustee, 148 Ky. 407, 147 S.W. 25 (1912);
Hite v. Bite, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S.W. 778 (1892). See also Bali's Ex'r v. Woodford
Bank and Trust Co., 311 Ky. 474, 224 S.W. 2d 678 (1949) (dictum).
'Ortiz v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 159 AUt. 376 (Del. 1931); Bryan
v. Aiken, 10 Del. Ch. 446, 86 AUt. 674, 685 (1913), where the "American' rule
is stated: ". . all net earnings, however they may have been treated or used
by the corporation during their accumulation, and regardless of the period during
which they have accumulated, if declared as dividends out of net profits during
the life tenancy, are given to the life tenant when declared, whether such dividends
are made in cash or capital stock, provided that the principal of the trust is not
diminished thereby."
Hite v. Hite, supra note 2, at 265, 20 S.W. at 779.
Id. at 266, 20 S.W. at 780. "If it be really profit, then he should have it,
whether paid in stock or money.
Lindau v. Conimunity Fund of Baltimore, 53 A. 2d 409 (Md. 1947); Earp's
Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857); 2 ScoTT, supra note la, sec. 236.3; 4 BOGERT, TRus
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principal. This rule sometimes is praised because it achieves "ideal
justice" between the life tenant and the remaindermen,8 but it presents
very practical difficulties of application to the trustee and the courts
because it requires a detailed analysis of the financial records of the
corporation to fix the time when the earnings were realized. 9
The "Massachusetts" rule, now followed by a majority of the
states, awards the dividend to the remaindermen if essentially a stock
dividend, and to the life tenant if essentially a cash dividend, without
inquiry in either case as to the time covered by the earnings.10 This
rule, like Kentucky's old one, implies that allocation according to
nature of the receipt solves any problems of apportionment that may
be involved. As the court in the instant case put it: "A stock dividend
does not distribute property but simply dilutes the shares as they
existed before."1 This view rests on the theory that stock dividends
are merely bookkeeping processes of corporations, or are only read-
justments of the corporate structure, and therefore do not represent a
division of income from capital.12 This rule is thought to be fairer
than the old Kentucky rule in that both the life tenant and the re-
maindermen will benefit from the stock dividend, since the life tenant
will draw income from the stock once it is assigned to principal.'3
In adopting the Massachusetts rule in the instant case, the Kentucky
court emphasized this point by providing specifically that all cash
dividends declared on the stock issued as a result of a stock dividend
during the continuance of the life interest shall be payable to the life
beneficiary.' 4 The principal weakness in this rule is the fact that it
does not indicate the legal criteria for determining whether the divi-
dend is "essentially" cash or whether it is "essentially" stock.15
An TRusm s sec. 848 (1935). The pertinent statute in Pennsylvania now reads:
"(1) All dividends on shares of a corporation, forming a part of the principal,
which are payable in the shares of the corporation itself of the same kind and
rank as the shares on which such dividend is paid shall be deemed principal ...
20 PuRDoN PA. sec. 3470.5 (1953).
'4 BOGERT, supra note 7, sec. 857.9Ibid. 2 ScoTT, supra note la, sec. 236.3. But see 5 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
288, 293 (1948).
"Gibbons v. Mahon; 136 U.S. 549 (1890); First National Bank of Tuska-
loosa v. Hill, 241 Ala. 606' 4 So. 2d 170 (1941); United States Trust Co. v.
Cowin 121 Neb. 427, 287 N.W. 284 (1931); Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101
(1868); 2 ScoTr supra note la, sec. 286.3; 4 BOGERT, supra note 7, see. 851.
'Bowles v. Stilley's Exr, 267 S.W. 2d 707, 708 (Ky. 1954).
"Gibbons v. Mahon, supra note 10, at 569; First Natl Bank Tuskaloosa v.
Hill, supra note 10, 4 So. 2d at 172.
1 4 BOGERT, supra note 7, sec. 857, unless, of course, the stock dividend is
granted as part of the liquidation process. See Laurent v. Randolph, supra note 2,
and 5 WAsaI. & LEE L. ,Ev. 288, 293 (1948).
U Bowles v. Stilley's Ex'r, supra note 11, at 709.
" One may imply that the ultimate criteria is the source of the funds from
which the dividend is paid. If paid from the earnings or surplus, it is clearly a
cash dividend. If paid from capital for the purpose of splitting ownership shares,
it is clearly a stock dividend.
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The Kentucky court's renunciation of the old rule is commendable, 16
but it has confused the Kentucky law by ignoring the legislative solu-
tion to the problem which was enacted in 1950. Kentucky Revised
Statutes section 386.020(4) provides this formula for the allocation
problem presented in the instant case:
All dividends on shares of a corporation forming a part of the principal
of an estate or trust which are payable in shares of the same class of
the corporation and which are payable at a rate of ten per cent or
more of the corporation's outstanding shares of such class before such
dividend, shall be deemed principal of the estate or trust, and all such
dividends payable at a rate less than ten per cent of the corporation's
outstanding shares of such class before such dividend, shall be deemed
income of the estate or trust . .. (Note that the statute applies to
both legal and equitable divisions of the property interest.)
Although the allocation made in the instant case would have been
the same under the statute, the Court of Appeals made it for an entirely
different reason. The court allocated the extraordinary dividend to
principal because it was essentially a stock rather than a cash dividend.
This is not the basis of the statutory allocation at all. The statute
merely declares, without rationalization, that stock dividends, payable
at the rate of ten percent or more, as in the instant case, shall be
deemed principal, and all such dividends payable at a rate less than
ten percent shall be deemed income. Thus, it can be seen that al-
though the Kentucky rule based on this decision looks to the nature
of the dividend, the applicable Kentucky statute looks to the amount
of the dividend. Although the statutory formula fails to distinguish
the problems of allocation and apportionment, it nevertheless does
express the will of the legislature, and it is submitted that the Court
of Appeals at least should have referred to it in overruling the old
Kentucky rule. In failing to do so the court lost a good opportunity
to relate the statutory formula to the case law governing the problem.
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" It should be pointed out that disagreement with the old Kentucky rule
was voiced by the court some time ago. Laurent v. Randolph, supra note 2, at 138,
206 S.W. 2d at 483; Hubley's Guardian v. Wolfe, supra note 2, at 584, 82 S.W.
2d at 835. See the prediction in 5 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 288 at 294 (1948).
